UE has no valid native 5G NAS security context, the UE shall ship the REGISTRATION REQUEST message with out integrity safety and encryption. The AMF shall select the NAS algorithms identifiers to be utilized in the target MME after the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode in 5GMM-Connected mode, for encryption and integrity protection. It’s terminated after inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode in 5GMM-Linked mode or when the NAS signalling connection is released. When a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode establishes a new NAS signalling connection and has a legitimate current 5G NAS safety context, the UE shall transmit the preliminary NAS message integrity protected with the current 5G NAS security context and further protect this message as specified in subclause 4.4.6. The UE shall embrace the ngKSI indicating the present 5G NAS security context worth in the initial NAS message. When a new 5G NAS safety context is derived using the identical KAMF, the goal AMF includes the 8 least significant bits of the downlink NAS Count in the Intra N1 mode NAS transparent container IE, and signifies that a new KAMF shall not be derived (see subclause 9.11.2.6). The AMF shall increment the downlink NAS Rely by one after creating the Intra N1 mode NAS transparent container IE.

N26 interface is not supported, the AMF shall set off a primary authentication and key agreement process. Each UE and AMF shall proceed to use the present 5G NAS security context, until the AMF initiates a safety mode management procedure. This may be used by the AMF to take a non-current 5G NAS safety context into use or to modify the present 5G NAS security context by selecting new NAS security algorithms. The UE shall additionally derive the NAS keys as specified in TS 33.401 utilizing the EPS NAS safety algorithms identifiers which can be saved in the UE’s 5G NAS security context. The UE shall send this message integrity protected using the mapped 5G NAS safety context and additional protect this message as specified in subclause 4.4.6 and subclause 5.5.1.3.2. From this time onward, all NAS messages exchanged between the UE and the AMF are sent integrity protected using the mapped 5G NAS security context, and except for the messages specified in subclause 4.4.5, all NAS messages exchanged between the UE and the AMF are sent ciphered utilizing the mapped 5G NAS security context. The type field is about to indicate a mapped safety context. When the UE working in single-registration mode in a network supporting N26 interface receives a command to perform inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode in 5GMM-Related mode, the UE shall derive the mapped EPS safety context, i.e. derive K’ASME from KAMF utilizing a downlink NAS Rely based mostly on the NAS sequence quantity received in the N1 mode to S1 mode NAS clear container IE (see subclause 9.11.2.7) as described in TS 33.501. The UE shall set the uplink and downlink NAS Rely values associated with the newly derived K’ASME key to the uplink and downlink NAS Count values of the current 5G NAS safety context respectively.

Throughout an N1 mode to N1 mode handover, secure trade of NAS messages is established between the AMF and the UE by: – the transmission of NAS security associated parameters encapsulated in the AS signalling from the goal AMF to the UE triggering the N1 mode to N1 mode handover (see TS 33.501). The UE uses these parameters to create a new 5G NAS safety context. Be aware 1: During N1 mode to N1 mode handover, the Intra N1 mode NAS transparent container IE (see subclause 9.11.2.6) is equal to sending a Security MODE COMMAND message to the UE so as to derive and use a new 5G NAS security context, optionally created with a new KAMF. When a new 5G NAS safety context is created from a new KAMF, the goal AMF consists of the 8 least significant bits of the downlink NAS Rely in the Intra N1 mode NAS clear container IE and indicates that a new KAMF shall be derived (see subclause 9.11.2.6). The AMF shall then set each the uplink. In any other case, if the new 5G NAS safety context is created from a new KAMF, the AMF and the UE shall set the downlink NAS Depend and uplink NAS Count to zero for the non-3GPP entry.

2. the UE is in 5GMM-Linked mode over non-3GPP entry, in order to activate the new 5G NAS safety context over the non-3GPP access that has been activated for the 3GPP entry the AMF shall ship the Safety MODE COMMAND message over the non-3GPP entry as described in TS 33.501. The Safety MODE COMMAND message shall include the similar ngKSI to determine the new 5G NAS safety context that was activated over the 3GPP access. After the new 5G NAS safety context is taken into use for 3GPP entry following a profitable N1 mode to N1 mode handover and the UE is registered with the similar PLMN over the 3GPP access and non-3GPP access: 1. the UE is in 5GMM-IDLE mode over non-3GPP access, the AMF and the UE shall activate and take into use the new 5G NAS safety context over the non-3GPP access as described in TS 33.501 after the AMF sends or the UE receives the REGISTRATION Accept message respectively. When the UE receives a command to perform handover to NG-RAN including an Intra N1 mode NAS clear container IE (see subclause 9.11.2.6), the UE derives a new 5G NAS security context as described in TS 33.501. When the Intra N1 mode NAS transparent container IE signifies that a new KAMF needs to be derived, the UE shall set both the downlink NAS Count and uplink NAS Depend to zero after creating the new 5G NAS security context.

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